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Party politics or (supra-)national interest? 
External relations votes in the European Parliament 
 




Parliamentary votes on foreign and security policy have often been demonstrations of patriotism and 
national unity. These resonate with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, 
or that politics stops at the water’s edge. Its supranational character makes the European Parliament 
a particularly interesting laboratory for subjecting this thesis to empirical scrutiny. Analyzing roll-
call votes from 1979-2014, this paper shows that group cohesion and coalition patterns are no 
different in external relations votes than in other issue areas. MEPs do not rally around an EU flag, 
nor do MEPs vote as national blocs in votes on foreign and security policy, trade and development 
aid. Based on statistical analyses and interviews with parliamentary civil servants, it concludes that 








Parliamentary votes on external relations have often been demonstrations of unity. An analysis of 
votes in the US Congress shows that bipartisanship was more frequent when members of Congress 
voted on external relations as compared to domestic policy issues (Kupchan & Trubowitz 2007: 11).2 
This finding resonates with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, or, as 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg famously put it, that politics stops at the water’s edge. Vandenberg’s 
statement is primarily normative, rather than descriptive: whereas political parties may legitimately 
                                                      
1 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Dutch-Flemish Political Science conference 
in Leiden in June 2017, the European International Studies Association conference in Barcelona in 
September 2017 and the workshop “Political Parties and Foreign Policy” at the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam in October 2017. We are grateful to all comments and suggestions received at these 
occasions, particularly to Daan Fonck, Julie Kaarbo, Lorenzo Cicchi and Guri Rosén. We also want 
to thank Anna-Riikka Aarnio and Rosanne Anholt for their support in coding and calculating EP 
votes. 
2 Trubowitz and Kupchan follow the coding scheme of Aage Clausen (1973) who aggregates 
“international policy; foreign aid; aid to international organizations; armament policy; defense 
procurement; international trade; military pensions; etc.” into a “foreign and defense policy” category 
– which to us seems a misnomer and would be more aptly labelled as ‘external relations’. 
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disagree over domestic politics, they should understand that towards the outside world, there is a 
common interest that transcends and trumps party politics. According to Kenneth Schulz (2001), a 
strong signal of resolve is sent to the outside world if the opposition supports the government’s 
foreign policy whereas a lack of such support will be interpreted as weakness. It is therefore in the 
community’s interest to have maximum support for the government across political parties.  
 
In this paper, we further explore the notion that external relations are exempt from party politics by 
examining external relations roll-call votes in the European Parliament (EP). Although the EU is not 
a nation-state, the ‘politics-stops-at-the-water’s-edge’-logic applies because – with few exemptions 
from the political extremes - politicians from all member states and political parties share an interest 
in the EU’s negotiation success vis-à-vis third parties. As argued by Schulz (2001), the chances for 
successful negotiations with third parties increase when government policies are supported by a broad 
coalition in parliament, whether or not it possesses any formal decision-making competencies.  
 
Its supranational character makes the EP a particularly interesting laboratory. In the next section, after 
briefly outlining the role of the EP in the external relations of the European Union (EU), we will show 
that, on the one hand, supranational party politics is very much encouraged by the historical 
development and rules of procedure of the European Parliament. On the other hand, the members of 
the EP (MEPs) are (re-)nominated by their national parties that control candidate selection, 
facilitating thus a stronger influence for national interests. Despite a rich body of work on voting 
behaviour in the Parliament, scholars have not systematically investigated how MEPs vote in external 
relations issues. Our analysis is thus driven by three main questions: Is the level of agreement about 
external relations – amongst MEPs of the same political group, MEPs of the same national delegation 
and of the parliament as a whole – different than on other issues? Are external relations contested 
along a left/right-axis, as shown in coalition patterns? Are there differences across time periods and 
different categories of external relations votes? 
 
In the theoretical framework we discuss whether foreign and security policy indeed forms a ‘special 
case’ in the specific context of the EP while differentiating between various external relations issues, 
and we put forward a number of hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis. Based on all plenary 
roll-call votes from 1979 and 2014 and supplementary interviews, the empirical section is divided 
into three parts. The first compares cohesion – of the parliament as a whole, of party groups and of 
national delegations - from 1979 to 2014. The second part focuses on votes from EP 6 (2004-2009) 
and EP 7 (2009-2014) – two legislative terms featuring a much higher number of external relations 
votes – and uncovers coalition dynamics between the party groups. The final empirical part zooms in 
on voting behaviour in specific external relations issues in EP 6 and EP 7.  
 
We show that, in contrast to the votes in the US Congress, mentioned above, in the European 
Parliament external relations are not exempted from party politics. MEPs do not rally around an EU 
flag when they vote on external relations. Nor do MEPs from the same countries reach higher levels 
of unity when it comes to foreign affairs. Furthermore, coalition patterns in external relations are very 
similar to the ones in other areas, pointing to the dominance of the left-right dimension. Our findings 
are also remarkably stable, with hardly any consistent differences over time or between policy areas 
or geographical regions. This underlines the need to engage in systematic analysis of larger voting 
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data sets, as case studies of highly contested policy processes can exaggerate the level of 
parliamentary disagreement found within individual policy areas. At the same time we did uncover 
some variation, with especially votes on arms trade and on North America and Turkey divisive and 
thus requiring further investigation. Hence we conclude that the EU’s supranational parliament stands 
out by having party politics dominate all business, including external relations.  
 
Theorising voting behaviour in external relations   
Mind the context: the increasing role of the European Parliament  
Over the years, the European Parliament changed from a purely consultative body with members 
seconded from national parliaments to a directly-elected EP with significant legislative, control and 
budgetary powers. The Parliament shapes EU laws and the EU’s budget, it is involved in the 
appointment of the Commission and can force it to resign. In addition, MEPs have proven remarkably 
inventive in pushing for more powers between Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC), adopting 
practices that have over time become the established course of action. (Ripoll Servent 2018) 
 
These developments apply also to external relations, an issue area long beyond the reach of MEPs. 
In line with research on voting in the US Congress (see footnote one above), we use ‘external 
relations’ as an umbrella term covering all relations or policies the EU has with third countries or 
international organisations from trade and development aid to the development of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy / Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP / CSDP).  The Parliament enjoys 
after the Lisbon Treaty substantial legislative rights in international trade and international 
agreements. Laws defining the framework for common commercial policy, such as on anti-dumping, 
are adopted by co-decision procedure, and the consent of the EP is required for international 
agreements concluded in areas where the ordinary legislative procedure applies. Perhaps more 
importantly, as in other policy fields where the Parliament has gained powers, stronger legislative 
rights have contributed to better information rights, with the Commission – that negotiates on behalf 
of EU – reporting actively to the EP on trade and international agreements, both before and during 
the negotiations. MEPs have also exploited their new powers, notably when striking down the SWIFT 
Agreement in February 2010 and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in June 2012. 
Considering that the EU is the largest trading bloc, through its legislative and veto powers in 
international trade and other agreements, including accepting new member states to the Union, the 
Parliament can also wield at least indirect influence in CFSP / CSDP. (Ripoll Servent 2014; Rosén 
2015b)  
 
Foreign and security policy remains decidedly more intergovernmental, with a weaker role for the 
supranational institutions. Essentially the Parliament debates and adopts resolutions on CFSP / CSDP 
and can engage in a dialogue with the EU’s foreign minister (High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also a Vice-President of the Commission) and the other 
EU institutions over various CFSP / CSDP matters. However, while the EP brings much-needed 
transparency to CFSP / CSDP through its debating function, the main instruments of the Parliament 
are nonetheless more indirect in kind. Through its legislative powers in trade and development policy 
and its powers to strike down international agreements, the EP can exert pressure on third countries 
and international organizations, for example regarding human rights where the Parliament has shown 
notable activism (including its annual Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought). Another avenue of 
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influence is money, as the EP must approve the annual CFSP budget (Smith et al. 2012; Rosén 2015b). 
The EP also has a large number of delegations to international or regional parliamentary assemblies 
(such as the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and EuroLat) and individual third countries, 
through which MEPs can exercise ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ and networking. The Parliament has 
thus emerged as a significant actor in EU’s external relations, with its votes decisive in international 
trade and agreements, development policy and accession of new member states, but in CFSP / CSDP 
MEPs still remain primarily as underdogs vis-à-vis the Council and national governments. (E.g., 
Rosén 2015a, 2015b; Stavridis & Irrera 2015; Raube & Rosén 2018) 
 
Voting in the Parliament: overall patterns 
The EP party system has throughout the history of the directly-elected Parliament been effectively 
dominated by the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the centre-left Party of the 
European Socialists (PES; the official group name has been Socialists & Democrats (S&D) after the 
2009 elections), with the liberal group (currently ALDE) also present in the chamber since the 1950s. 
The groups of the greens (including the regionalists), the radical left, the conservatives, and the 
eurosceptics have also become ‘institutionalized’ in the chamber since the first direct elections, 
although particularly the conservative and the Eurosceptical groups have been much less stable in 
terms of the composition and names of the groups.  
 
Much of the research on EP party groups is based on roll-call voting data.3 Following the ‘first 
generation’ of studies, which examined limited numbers of votes (e.g., Attinà 1990; Raunio 1997), 
subsequent research has been far more ambitious and methodologically sophisticated. This research 
has produced two main findings (see Hix et al. 2005, 2007; Hix & Hoyland 2013; Bressanelli 2014; 
Bowler & McElroy 2015).4 First, the party groups achieve relatively high levels of cohesion, often 
even above 90 % and generally higher than national delegations. One reason for individual MEPs and 
national parties to vote with their group most of the time is policy influence. Cohesive action is 
essential for the achievement of a group’s objectives, and cooperative behaviour within groups helps 
individual MEPs to pursue their own goals. As the Parliament has acquired more legislative powers, 
party groups thus have a stronger incentive and need to act cohesively. Moreover, given the enormous 
number of amendments and final resolutions voted upon in plenary sessions, the voting cues provided 
by groups and particularly by group members in the responsible EP committee are an essential source 
of guidance for MEPs (Ringe 2010). Less institutionalized or ideologically more fragile groups, such 
as the radical left, often do not even try to form unitary group positions. The fact that party groups 
achieve higher levels of cohesion than national delegations is a strong indication that the EP is a truly 
supranational institution. By implication, political conflict cannot be captured by the “international 
                                                      
3 There is also debate over the validity of the roll-call data. Because recorded votes represent only a 
sample of the totality of votes in the Parliament, the representativeness of the sample is of crucial 
concern (e.g., Carrubba et al. 2006; Trumm 2015; Thierse 2016; Cicchi 2016). However, a possible 
bias does not affect our main aim in this paper, namely a comparison between external relations and 
other votes, because there is no reason to expect that the roll-call votes in foreign policy would be 
any less representative of the overall votes than in any other issue area.  
4 Voting behaviour in the EP has received detailed attention from scholars since the late 1990s. Here 




relations model” (Steenbergen & Marks 2004: 5) according to which positions result from national 
interests. Enlargements have not really changed group cohesion levels; the two main groups continue 
to vote together around two-thirds or 70 % of the time, and representatives from new member states 
do not defect any more from their group than average MEPs (Hix & Noury 2009; Lindstädt et al. 
2012). 
 
Studies based on European Election Study survey data and on expert surveys have produced largely 
similar results with respect to the levels of group cohesion (Thomassen et al. 2004; McElroy & Benoit 
2007, 2012; Schmitt & Thomassen 2009). Research has also uncovered how various individual-level 
factors, such as ideological distance from the group position, proximity of elections, or the career 
plans of MEPs, influence party cohesion and coalition formation. Most importantly from our point of 
view, it indicates that when MEPs receive conflicting voting instructions from national parties and 
their EP groups, they are more likely to side with their national party, particularly in parties in which 
the leadership has more or better opportunities to punish and reward its MEPs (such as through more 
centralized candidate selection or closed lists): ‘Despite the fact that the parliamentary principals in 
the EP control important benefits — such as committee assignments and speaking time — it is the 
principals that control candidate selection (the national parties) who ultimately determine how MEPs 
behave. When the national parties in the same parliamentary group decide to vote together, the EP 
parties look highly cohesive. But when these parties take opposing policy positions, the cohesion of 
the EP parties break down.’ (Hix 2002: 696) This implies that when national interests are at stake, 
party group unity is likely to suffer. 
 
Second, the left–right dimension is the main cleavage in the Parliament, with the anti/pro-integration 
dimension constituting the secondary axis of competition, particularly since the start of the euro crisis 
(Otjes & van der Veer 2016; Blumenau & Lauderdale 2018). This means that any two party groups 
are more likely to vote the same way, the closer they are to another on the socioeconomic left-right 
dimension. For many issues, there is an absolute majority requirement (50 % plus one MEP) that 
facilitates cooperation between the two main groups, EPP and PES, which between them controlled 
around two-thirds of the seats until the 2014 elections. Cooperation between EPP and S&D is also 
influenced by inter-institutional considerations, because only moderate amendments are likely to be 
accepted by the Council and the Commission (Kreppel 2002). In fact, the clear majority votes are 
passed with large super majorities, constituting thus “hurrah votes” (Bowler & McElroy 2015).  
 
External relations: a special case or business like usual? 
External relations are often identified as a policy area where strong collective interests overshadow 
party-political differences. Inter-institutional considerations provide additional incentives for 
overcoming partisan divisions. As argued above, the EP has throughout its history been the 
‘underdog’, fighting to be granted more powers. In line with the ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ 
idiom whereby party-political squabbles are set aside in favour of a common interest, this suggests 
the need to act responsibly and not to endanger EU level unity that often requires lengthy bargaining 
in the Council. The Parliament has also consistently favoured deeper integration, including in external 





H1a: Cohesion in the whole Parliament is higher in external relations votes than in other votes. 
 
The main rationale for group formation in any legislature is that it helps like-minded legislators to 
achieve their policy goals, and previous research shows that the EP groups are ideologically quite 
cohesive. Yet whether such like-mindedness extends to external relations is not self-evident. As 
argued in the introductory article of this Special Issue (Raunio & Wagner 2019), especially in security 
and defence policy the notion of a core ‘national interest’ that forms the ‘raison d'être’ of the state in 
international politics is still widely shared. This national interest might stem from geography (such 
as proximity to an unfriendly neighbour), past historical events (such as experience of the Second 
World War), or military alliances (such as NATO). In these cases there probably is broad partisan 
and societal consensus behind the national interest, and the development of CFSP / CSDP certainly 
has been influenced by such strongly-held national preferences.  
 
Attinà (1990) showed that in the 1984-89 EP the cohesion of party groups was higher than average 
in international issues. Examining votes on the Gulf War, on relations with Arab countries, and on 
Yugoslavia, Raunio (1997: 110-111) found group cohesion to be similar when compared with his 
overall sample of votes. Moving to studies utilizing larger data sets, Hix, Noury and Roland (2007: 
127) compared group unity across issue areas (economic, environment, social, external, agriculture, 
institutional, internal EP) between 1979 and 2004, concluding that  
 
‘in general, the substantive subject of the vote does not seem to affect the level of cohesion of the 
parties. Nevertheless, parties are generally less cohesive on external relations issues (such as trade, 
aid, security and defence policies) and internal parliamentary issues (such as the organisation of 
the parliament’s timetable). This is not surprising. Some external relations issues probably split 
MEPs on national lines as well as along party lines.’  
 
On the other hand, EU member states have also key interests to defend in internal market legislation, 
with votes in the Parliament having strong distributive effects between and inside individual 
countries. These are also the core areas of the EP’s law-making powers unlike in external relations 
where non-legislative votes still dominate, with party groups thus having a stronger need to build 
unitary group positions. EU’s external relations, particularly CFSP / CSDP, is discussed and decided 
primarily in the Council and the European Council between national executives, not in the Parliament. 
Hence there are good grounds for arguing any interests, be they national, party-political, or 
constituency-related, are in fact less ‘intense’ in external relations votes. Another counter-argument 
to foreign affairs constituting a ‘special case’ is institutional in character. As the research outlined 
above showed, party groups and committees have developed their own ‘ways of doing things’ over 
the decades, with new MEPs quickly socialized into existing parliamentary norms. This line of 
reasoning suggests few if any differences between external relations and policy sectors.    
 
These contradictory findings and arguments ask for a more systematic inquiry, which is guided by 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: The cohesion of national delegations is higher in external relations than in other votes, with 




In line with our argument about national interests being more prominent in external relations, once 
the EP has won powers we should see increasing division in the chamber as the votes simply matter 
more than before, both within groups and in the chamber as a whole. Furthermore, while the clear 
majority of MEPs have always been pro-integrationist, ideological diversity inside the Parliament has 
increased due to enlargements and the politicization of European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2012), 
with various Eurosceptical voices also becoming gradually more numerous in the institution. This 
diversity should impact on all votes, including on external relations, with particularly more 
Eurosceptical representatives opposing EU level measures. Hence we formulate two hypotheses 
about longitudinal developments:  
 
H2a: Cohesion in the whole chamber in external relations votes has decreased over time.   
H2b: Party group cohesion in external relations votes has decreased over time. 
 
With a view to coalition patterns, Raunio (1997: 112-117) found that votes on the Gulf War showed 
strong disagreements between the centre-right and the leftist groups, while votes on Yugoslavia 
produced no stable coalitions among the party groups. Both sets of votes were highly contested, with 
a low level of unity in the chamber. Such differences were also established by Viola (2000) in her 
detailed analysis of the stances of EP party groups on the Gulf War and on Yugoslavian conflicts, 
with party groups disagreeing especially about use of force. However, these studies were based on a 
limited number of votes. Hix and Høyland (2013: 179-180) show that coalition patterns in external 
relations largely follow the overall coalition dynamics in the chamber, although trade votes displayed 
somewhat more competition between the EPP and PES. Examining votes on international trade from 
2009 to 2013, van den Putte, de Ville and Orbie (2015: 60-62) find that coalition patterns follow a 
left-right division.  
 
As outlined in the introductory article of this Special Issue (Raunio & Wagner 2019), these findings 
are in line with studies of the US Congress and select other legislatures that found the left-right 
dimension to explain voting patterns on trade issues, with party preferences driven by constituency 
interests. Centre-right parties are more supportive of free trade than leftist parties that are more willing 
to use protectionist measures to safeguard social, consumer, industrial or environmental interests. 
Leftist MPs are more likely to support foreign aid and funding of international financial institutions, 
while populist and radical right parties are particularly critical of development aid. (E.g. Verdier 1994; 
Thérien & Noël 2000; Hiscox 2002; Milner & Judkins 2004; Broz & Hawes 2006; Broz 2011; Milner 
& Tingley 2015.) More recently in Europe much of the criticism towards the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) has come from the political left, with the centre-right more in favour 
of free trade with the United States (Jančić 2017). These votes on trade are in the EP primarily about 
legislation which means that national parties need to take the views of their constituents more 
seriously while party groups need often to build absolute majorities and with group leaders having 
stronger incentives to ensure that all MEPs follow the group line.  
 
While coalitions on trade and development can be expected to follow the left-right dimension, it is 
less clear whether how party groups vote in other types of external relations questions can be deducted 
from their positions on either the left-right dimension or any other cleavage. The bulk of the existing 
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research has focused on the specific question of the use of force, showing quite consistently that 
‘hawks’ are more often found among centre-right MPs and ‘doves’ on the left (see the articles by 
Haesebrouck & Mello (2019) and Raunio & Wagner (2019) in this Special Issue). In Europe parties 
on the right, with the exception of the radical right, are more supportive of military missions than 
leftist parties (Wagner et al. 2018), and centre-right governments are also more likely to enter into 
military conflicts (e.g. Palmer et al. 2004; Clare 2010; Mello 2014). These considerations result in 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H3a: External relations votes are structured along a left-right dimension. Voting likeness therefore 
is, ceteris paribus, higher between party groups that occupy neighbouring positions on the left-
right-scale than between other party groups. 
 
However, our findings may be influenced by lumping votes on a broad range of issues into a single 
“external relations” category and thereby glossing over important differences across issues. For 
example, the “rally around the flag-effect” that partly explains the hurrah!-votes in the US Congress 
may be absent in votes on development aid or the condemnation of human rights violations. In order 
to further test the robustness of the hypotheses outlined above, we therefore disaggregate external 
relations votes.  
 
Building on securitization theory of the Copenhagen school (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998), we 
assume that party politics will be the less pronounced the closer an issue sits at the hard core of 
security and defense. When it comes to existential threats and the survival of a community, it is more 
likely that appeals to overcome party-political divisions succeed. By contrast, trade issues have 
mostly distributive consequences that make it more likely that different political parties will express 
the interests of winners and losers respectively. Especially following the Lisbon Treaty, this is also 
an area where the Parliament enjoys legislative powers through co-decision procedure and the right 
of veto in international agreements.  
 






The analysis is based on all roll-call votes taken in the European Parliament between the first (1979) 
and eighth (2014) direct EP elections (N = 28349), as provided by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and 
Gerard Roland (Hix et al. 2007). The number of roll-call votes per electoral term has increased 
consistently, with 886 votes in EP 1 (1979-84) to 6961 in EP 7 (2009-2014). 21031 votes were coded 
by issue area and 2750 (13 %) of these dealt with external relations, with a significant increase over 
the decades. This growing number of external relations votes is obviously in part explained by 
legislative empowerment, with the Parliament simply having to process trade laws and international 
agreements. Yet it also probably reflects both the gradual development of CFSP / CSDP and the 
politicization of external relations.  
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Unfortunately, the coding scheme differs between the legislative terms. From EP 1 to EP 3 the 
category ‘external / trade’ lumps together votes on foreign policy, trade and development while for 
EP 4 the category was titled ‘external trade / aid’. For EP 5 we have a more fine-grained measure that 
distinguishes between votes on ‘accession’, ‘defence’, ‘development’, ‘enlargement’, ‘external / 
trade’, ‘foreign affairs’ and ‘trade’. For EP 6 votes were identified by both policy area and the 
responsible committee. The relevant committees are the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and 
its two subcommittees (on Security and Defence and on Human Rights), Committee on International 
Trade (INTA), and Committee on Development (DEVE). For EP 7, no information on committees is 
available. Instead, policy areas are identified that include “development”, “foreign & security policy” 
and “international trade”; the same categories are also used for EP 6. 
 
For EP 6 and EP 7, the two legislative terms with by far the highest number of external relations 
votes, we disaggregated votes thematically. First, we divided the votes into three broad categories – 
international trade, development, and foreign and security policy. This classification follows 
committee jurisdictions in EP 6 and policy area coding in EP 7. In order to arrive at a more nuanced 
picture of voting behaviour, we also categorized the votes in EP 6 and EP 7 into more specific issue 
areas and geographical regions: In terms of issue areas, we distinguished between democracy, rule of 
law and human rights (347 votes); enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (266); CFSP / 
CSDP (254); arms and arms control (77); conflict (271); and agreements / treaties (53). With a view 
to regions, we distinguished between Europe (269); Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (147); 
Russia, including the Northern Dimension (85); USA and Canada (60); China (40); Asia (168); Sub-
Saharan Africa (83); Latin America (64); Turkey (109); and Global (220).5 
 
Furthermore, we carried out in May-September 2017 five interviews with civil servants that have 
considerable experience of working for the relevant EP committees (AFET, INTA, DEVE) and party 
groups. Many of the interviewees had also worked for other EP committees, and were thus able to 
compare different sectoral committees. The purpose of these interviews was to provide first-hand 
information about decision-making culture in the committees and the party groups, but given their 
limited number, information derived from the interviews should be seen as supplementary to our main 
voting data set.    
 
To examine the cohesion of a group, either the parliament as a whole, a party group or a national 
delegation, we use the Agreement Index (AI) as developed by Hix et al. (2007: 91-95). It draws on 
the often-used index of Rice (1928), but differs from it by taking into account abstentions as MEPs 
have three voting options (Yes, No, Abstain).6 The AI ranges from 0 to 1. When all party group 
members vote the same way, the score is 1. If the party group is completely divided, with a third of 
the members voting ‘yes’, a third voting ‘no’ and a third abstaining, the score is 0. 
 
                                                      
5 For a more detailed outline of the coding scheme, please see the online appendix. 
6 Incorporating the ’Abstain’ option in the index is important, as there is evidence that MEPs choose 
to vote ‘Abstain’ when the positions of their national parties and the EP groups diverge (Mühlbock 
& Yordanova 2017). 
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For each of the seven EPs, we calculated the average agreement index for external relations votes and 
for votes on other issues for every political group, every national delegation and for the parliament as 
a whole. We ran t-tests to determine whether the differences are statistically significant. We report 
all calculations and the results from the t-tests in the online appendix. 
 
 
Cohesion of the parliament as a whole, party groups and national delegations 
Figure 1 visualizes the cohesion of the whole parliament when voting on external relations and on 
other issues. While the box plots are tall and the whiskers stretch across a broad range of values, the 
medians for external relations and other votes are close to each other. The t-tests confirm that there 
is only little support for our first hypothesis according to which cohesion in the EP as a whole would 
be higher in external relations votes. As reported in detail in the online appendix, the average 
agreement index for external relations votes is not consistently higher than the average agreement 
index for votes on other issues (in EP 3, it is lower). Where it is higher, the difference is not 
statistically significant in half of the cases, and where it is statistically significant, the difference is 
small (the average for all seven EPs is 0,021). With a view to overall cohesion, the EP clearly differs 
from the US Congress (Kupchan & Trubowitz 2007) and many national parliaments (Wagner et al. 
2018). Hypothesis H2a that cohesion is decreasing is confirmed: the trendline for external relations 
votes shows a small decrease in the average AI.7  
 
Figure 1: Levels of cohesion (as measured by Agreement Index) of the parliament as a whole for 






                                                      




T-tests for each national delegation and each political group find weak support for our hypothesis 
H1b: for almost 80% of the national delegations, external relations votes do not have a significantly 
higher cohesion than other votes. Of the 54 political groups that operated in the seven EPs, only the 
Rainbow group in the 3rd EP and UEN group in the 5th EP had significantly lower levels of cohesion 
for external relations votes. For ca 37% of all political groups, the opposite applied, i.e. external 
relations votes had significantly higher levels of cohesion than other votes. However, the average 
difference in this group remains small (0.046 on average). 
 
Previous research has consistently shown party groups to be considerably more cohesive than national 
delegations – that is, all MEPs elected from a particular member state. This finding applies also to 
external relations votes. Higher AIs are primarily reserved for small countries with a small number 
of MEPs such as Malta, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Estonia, but also for Hungary and Romania. The 
UK, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands were the least united national delegations in EP 6 and 
EP 7. Otherwise no clear pattern emerges either over time or between various issues – foreign and 
security policy, trade, and development. Moreover, the AIs are rather similar with the overall 
cohesion scores, thus providing further evidence that foreign policy is indeed ‘business like any other’ 
in the Parliament. 
 
Turning to party groups, the findings are again by and large in line with earlier research. The main 
party groups, notably EPP, PES, and ALDE, are highly cohesive, with voting cohesion in external 
relations on average just below or above 90 %. The same applies to the Greens with the exception of 
the 2004-2009 term and to the conservative ERC (previously ED). Many smaller and ‘less 
institutionalized’ groups, particularly the Eurosceptical EFD, display consistently lower levels of 
cohesion. As with national delegations, no clear picture emerges either over time or between the three 
main issue areas. The cohesion scores in external relations votes are also roughly comparable with 
overall AIs. The differences in EP 6 and EP 7 are small but in the same direction, with groups 
generally more cohesive in external relations votes.          
 
In order to compare the cohesion of party groups and national delegations systematically over time, 
we also calculated relative cohesion scores that take into account the level of conflict in the whole 
Parliament (Figure 2). The relative AI is computed per legislative term simply by taking the AI of the 
party group or national delegation and then dividing it with the AI of the whole chamber, with the 






Figure 2 visualizes that party groups are on average considerably more cohesive than national 
delegations. Furthermore, the figure shows that for both groups and delegations, differences in 
cohesion for external relations votes, on the one hand, and for votes on other issues, on the other hand, 
are small (the political groups in the 5th EP being an exemption). In the majority of cases, cohesion 
for votes on other issues is slightly higher than for external relations votes.  
 
We find only weak support for H2b about party group cohesion in external relations decreasing over 
time.  Although the overall trend is indeed towards less cohesion, the effect is very small (the trendline 
has a slope of -0,012).    
 
Examining EP 5, EP 6 and EP 7, we find no consistent pattern between trade, development, and other 
foreign policy votes. In the 1999-2004 electoral term development produced more division in the 
chamber, whereas in the subsequent electoral terms, trade was most and development was least 
contested. An exploration of cohesion scores thus offers consistent support about the ‘normalization’ 
of foreign affairs, with national interests no more disruptive inside the EP party groups or in the whole 
chamber and with the votes just as divisive as votes in other issue areas.  
 
Coalition patterns in external relations  
The second part of our empirical section focuses on coalitions. Given the much smaller number of 
external relations votes until the 2004 elections, we limit our analysis to EP 6 and EP 7. We calculate 
the voting similarity between all possible pairs of party groups in a straightforward manner (see tables 
1 and 2): two party groups were deemed to have voted the same way if the plurality of members in 
each group voted the same way (Yes, No, or Abstain) (Hix & Høyland 2013: 179). For each pair of 
party groups, we code whether they occupy ideologically neighbouring positions on the left/right-






EP 1 EP 2 EP 3 EP 4 EP 5 EP 6 EP 7
Figure 2: Average relative cohesion of party 
groups and national delegations for external 
relations and other votes
average relative AI ext rel (delegations) average relative AI other (delegations)
average relative AI ext rel (groups) average relative AI other (groups)
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likeness between ideological neighbours and other pairs are statistically significant.8 Theoretically 
the main difference should exist between distributive votes (trade and development) and other types 
of external relations questions, with the former set of votes expected to find distances between party 
groups following their locations on the left-right dimension. 
 
Table 1: Coalition Patterns: Voting likeness between party groups in EP 6 (2004-2009) 
 










EUL/NGL - G/EFA 79.8% 50% 71.0% 60.7% 64.0% 
G/EFA - PES 80.9% 58% 54.4% 61.6% 61.3% 
PES - ALDE 88.8% 78% 74.6% 74.2% 75.4% 
ALDE - EPP-ED 70.8% 81% 82.1% 79.4% 77.2% 
EPP-ED - UEN 89.9% 79% 84.5% 82.1% 81.1% 
UEN - IND/DEM 47.2% 50% 59.5% 53.6% 49.3% 
mean voting 
likeness 76.2% 66,1% 71.0% 68.6% 68.0% 
others  
ALDE - EUL/NGL 71.9% 35,1% 40.9% 42.9% 47.5% 
ALDE - G/EFA 82.0% 56,7% 41.7% 57.6% 55.3% 
ALDE - IND/DEM 19.1% 32,8% 50.8% 41.4% 40.8% 
ALDE - UEN 60.7% 69,0% 84.1% 73.1% 70.8% 
EPP-ED - EUL/NGL 55.1% 31,4% 29.0% 36.5% 40.4% 
EPP-ED - G/EFA 62.9% 46,6% 30.6% 45.2% 46.6% 
EPP-ED - IND/DEM 40.4% 39,9% 54.8% 47.2% 46.1% 
EPP-ED - PES 64.0% 72,5% 67.1% 69.0% 69.7% 
EUL/NGL - 
IND/DEM 19.1% 39,2% 28.2% 32.6% 33.8% 
EUL/NGL - PES 78.7% 42,4% 52.4% 52.8% 55.4% 
EUL/NGL - UEN 46.1% 37,4% 38.9% 39.4% 43.2% 
G/EFA - IND/DEM 19.1% 25,2% 29.4% 29.2% 31.4% 
G/EFA - UEN 53.9% 39,0% 39.3% 43.1% 45.8% 
IND/DEM - PES 20.2% 28,7% 48.4% 36.2% 35.3% 
PES - UEN 53.9% 59,9% 76.2% 62.8% 63.0% 
mean voting 
likeness 49.8% 46,9% 47.4% 47.3% 48.3% 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0152 0.0040 0.0068 0.0027 0.0034 
 
                                                      
8  We follow standard practice and treat the following party groups as ideological neighbours: 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) and Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA);  
G/EFA and Party of European Socialists (PES, EP 6) respectively Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D, EP 7); PES/S&D and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE); 
ALDE and European People's Party (EPP); EPP and Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN, EP 6) 
respectively European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, EP 7); UEN/ECR and 





Table 2: Coalition Patterns: Voting likeness between party groups in EP 7 (2009-2014) 
 









EFD / ECR 64% 59% 67% 62% 67% 
ECR / EPP 71% 60% 83% 68% 59% 
ALDE / EPP 80% 83% 83% 83% 78% 
ALDE / S&D 83% 83% 79% 82% 78% 
G-EFA / S&D 93% 68% 60% 68% 75% 
EUL-NGL / G-EFA 89% 59% 81% 69% 70% 
mean voting 
likeness 80% 69% 76% 72% 71% 
Others 
EUL-NGL / EFD 32% 32% 36% 33% 38% 
EUL-NGL / ECR 47% 36% 24% 33% 34% 
EUL-NGL / ALDE 76% 36% 36% 40% 50% 
EUL-NGL / EPP 59% 29% 29% 31% 44% 
EUL-NGL / S&D 83% 41% 53% 49% 60% 
EFD / ALDE 51% 52% 65% 56% 49% 
EFD / EPP 62% 59% 71% 63% 58% 
EFD / G-EFA 38% 38% 39% 38% 38% 
EFD / S&D 42% 50% 61% 53% 45% 
ECR / ALDE 64% 54% 78% 62% 55% 
ECR / G-EFA 50% 45% 26% 40% 36% 
ECR / S&D 54% 48% 59% 52% 43% 
ALDE / G-EFA 83% 64% 45% 60% 67% 
EPP/ G-EFA 66% 53% 37% 49% 57% 
EPP / S&D 71% 78% 71% 75% 74% 
mean voting 
likeness 59% 48% 49% 49% 50% 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0063 0.0030 0.0026 0.0008 0.0006 
 
 
In both EP 6 and EP 7 and across all external relations votes as well as development, foreign and 
security or international trade votes, ideologically neighbouring party groups have a significantly 
higher voting likeness than non-neighbouring groups. Turning first to EP 6, the highest voting 
likeness indices are between EPP and UEN (82 %), ALDE and EPP (79 %), ALDE and PES (74 %), 
and ALDE and UEN (73 %): The grand coalition between EPP and PES was formed in 69 % of 
external relations votes. Largely the same situation prevailed in the 2009-2014 Parliament. Here the 
highest voting likeness was between ALDE and EPP (83 %) and between ALDE and PES (82 %). 
External relations votes thus produce the same pattern as in all votes, with a broad coalition of the 
three centrist party groups (EPP, PES, ALDE) in the clear majority of the votes (Bowler & McElroy 
2015). 
 
There is hardly any systematic issue variation in either EP 6 or EP 7 and, overall and allowing for 
some exceptions, coalition patterns reflect parties’ placement on the left-right dimension. As with 
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cohesion values, we find no real systematic differences in coalition dynamics between external 
relations votes and overall votes in the chamber. The analysis thus produces mixed findings: on the 
one hand, our H3a is clearly supported by the data as voting likeness reflects party positions on the 
left-right dimension, but the same pattern applies to all votes as well. Regarding trade, our 
interviewees also underlined the importance of the north-south divide, with MEPs from northern 
member states more in favour of free trade and southern representatives more supportive of 
protectionist measures.     
 
Variation across issues and regions 
As regards variation across issues, party groups exhibit little variation in general. However, 
interestingly, enlargement votes produced divisions inside EUL / NGL, ALDE, EPP, IND/DEM-
EFD, and UEN. In votes on CFSP / CSDP the three centrist groups (EPP, PES, ALDE) vote often 
together, although again the differences between issue areas are small. The outlier category is 
nonetheless clearly ‘arms’, where at the level of the whole chamber the AI was 0,57. We had a closer 
look at this category of votes, and arms exports proved a particularly contested topic among MEPs, 
although group cohesion in arms exports votes was not lower than in other types of votes on arms. 
As for national delegations, their cohesion was often lowest in votes on arms. The most common 
coalitions in votes on arms were formed between EPP and UEN and PES and ALDE while this 
category saw less cooperation between EPP and PES than any other issue. This confirms that the left-
right dimension structures votes on arms. However, overall we find very little support for H3b as 
cohesion in the whole chamber was not higher in votes on security than in other external relations 
questions. Figure 3 shows variation across foreign policy issues and regions for the entire parliament.  
 
 
The whole Parliament was clearly least cohesive in votes on Turkey and USA / Canada, while votes 
on Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia saw least contestation in the chamber. As tables I and II in the online 
appendix show, EPP and ALDE were particularly divided over Turkey. Previous research, drawing 
on a much more limited number of votes, has also shown that Turkey divides opinions among MEPs, 
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Figure 3: Average level of cohesion (as measured by AI) 
across issues (EP 6 and 7)
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disagreed most in votes on USA / Canada. Otherwise the differences between regions are relatively 
small, both in terms of the cohesion of groups and national delegations and coalition patterns. 
 
To summarize, the closer inspection of votes in EP 6 and EP 7 did reveal some interesting variation 
in terms of both cohesion scores and coalition dynamics between issue areas and geographical 
regions. Yet, the big picture is one of consistency across issues and regions. The differences are often 
in the details and the contestation between or inside party groups may not always be about the actual 
issue or country. This came up also in essentially all our interviews, with the interviewees stating that 
excluding certain topical and highly contested issues, it can be very difficult to predict which topics 
prove controversial. For example, seemingly unimportant votes on trade with a distant developing 
country might trigger controversy because of the legal precedent set by a particular clause in the 
treaty. The same applies to votes on the human rights situation, with MEPs perhaps disagreeing about 
whether to support a stronger role for the EU / EP in safeguarding LGBT rights or in advancing 
corporate social responsibility. National delegations can also have different priorities explained by 
colonial history (e.g., Portuguese and Spanish MEPs interested in Latin America), economic factors 
(e.g., trade with Pakistan being important for member states with textile industries), or geographical 
proximity (e.g., the salience of Russia for several member states sharing a border with it). 
Furthermore, individual MEPs can be highly sensitive towards particular topics, such as Western 
Sahara, and this may explain the length of debates and the high number of votes.  
 
Concluding discussion 
This paper has analyzed external relations votes in the European Parliament. Whether we examine 
party group cohesion or coalitions, the voting patterns hardly differ from overall votes. National 
interests appear no more prominent when external relations are on the plenary agenda, with party 
groups reaching similar levels of cohesion as in internal market votes. Nor did we find any real change 
across time or between various external relations questions. Our results show that foreign policy does 
not constitute a ‘special case’ in the EP. The EP thus differs from the US Congress and other 
parliaments where votes on external relations are often less politicized than domestic politics. The 
European Parliament is used to building large majorities behind its resolutions – vis-à-vis the 
Commission, the Council, and the outside world – and also external relations thus find broad 
agreement between the main party groups, with opposition coming often from the Eurosceptical right 
and the radical left groups. Hence our findings are in line with the article by Cicchi, Garzia and 
Trechsel (2019) in this Special Issue, as they show that if a political party supports the EU, it will also 
support the further development of EU’s foreign and security policy, and vice versa. 
 
Our decision to focus on the ‘big picture’ was intentional. For example, as TTIP and the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) show, there is ample proof that 
international trade has become a much more contested issue area in recent years (Laursen & Roederer-
Rynning 2017). Yet our analysis shows that international trade as a whole is an issue area like any 
other. The same obviously holds for votes on Russia or the development of CFSP / CSDP, topics that 
may produce heated debates but overall are no more divisive in the Parliament than other topics. 
While we thus strongly encourage further research on individual foreign policy questions in the EP 
or other legislatures, our findings should also be taken as a warning against drawing too strong 
conclusions from case studies of individual policy processes. Such case studies are always tied to 
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specific issues or time points, and whilst often insightful and informative, they necessarily lack both 
a longitudinal and comparative perspective.    
 
An obvious question is why national interests do not surface? Returning to the puzzle outlined at the 
start of this paper, we believe our results are explained by three factors. First, the EP remains to some 
extent sidelined in CFSP / CSDP, and hence its votes are less consequential than in some national 
legislatures, most notably the US Congress. This applies especially to the use of force and the EU’s 
main security policy strategies that are primarily decided between member states in the Council and 
the European Council. Secondly, external relations cover a lot of ground, from condemnations of 
human rights violations in distant countries to important trade deals and military conflicts in 
neighbouring areas. As a result, while individual questions can produce controversy, most external 
relations votes are probably not that salient for most MEPs, a situation that probably is found also in 
other policy sectors like agriculture, environment or even internal market legislation. As our 
exploration of more specific issue areas and geographical regions suggested, there is a need to dig 
deeper into voting patterns in questions such as arms trade, Turkey and the enlargement process, or 
relations with USA. Only through such in-depth investigations, combining voting behaviour with 
plenary speeches and perhaps interviews, can we truly understand the positions of MEPs in various 
foreign affairs questions (see Braghiroli 2013; 2015). After all, our study was limited to studying 
voting cohesion and coalitions, excluding thus the content of the issues voted upon in the EP plenary.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the normalcy of external relations votes suggest that EP party groups 
manage to build unitary positions across all issue areas. While exact causal mechanisms are difficult 
to establish, our results thus emphasize the explanatory value of established institutional codes of 
conduct. EP committees and especially the more stable party groups have over the decades developed 
their own decision-making mechanisms and behavioural norms, and research has shown how new 
MEPs are socialized into such existing parliamentary practices. This point came strongly across in 
our interviews, with the interviewees underlining the similarities between committees and party 
groups. To be sure, there are differences between committees, depending for example on committee 
chairs, but clearly the committees responsible for external relations questions, including AFET, 
follow largely similar routines as other sectoral committees. For example, if MEPs or national parties 
intend to vote against the group position, they should inform their group beforehand – exactly as 
happens in other policy areas as well. The transparency of EP committees may account at least for 
some of the observed similarities, as foreign and security policy questions are not debated behind 
closed doors as often is the case in domestic legislatures. Nonetheless, ‘committee cultures’ in the 
European Parliament remain under-researched (Settembri & Neuhold 2009), and future research 
should thus explore further decision-making in external relations, also inside party groups. Finally, 
our results about the ‘normality’ of external relations will hopefully lead scholars to pay more 
attention to party politics, as until now research on the foreign policy activities of the EP have treated 
the institution as a unitary actor, thus neglecting the role of competing ideologies behind the positions 
of the Parliament. 
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Supplemenatry materials  
 
Coding of Issue Areas 
 
We code each foreign and security policy vote for the region and issue that it is about. Because a 
vote can be on several issues, some votes are assigned more than one issue code. For regions, we 
have only assigned one region per vote. 
For 254 out of 1522 votes, the issue was indeterminate and no value was assigned; for 277 votes, 




1) Europe: Europe other than the EU itself and other than Turkey (which is a category of its 
own) but including the Caucasus. These votes often address the accession process in 
individual countries, especially in EP6, but also the ‘situation’ in countries like Belarus.  
2) MENA: Middle East and North Africa and Iran (excluding Mauritania and Sudan but including 
Western Sahara). 
3) Russia: votes that pertain to Russia in particularly (including Northern Dimension).  
4) USA and Canada 
5) China: mainly just individual votes dealing with human rights. 
6) Asia: without China but including Afghanistan, Tajikistan & Kazakhstan 
7) SSA: Sub-Sahara Africa (including Saharan countries like Mali, Chad). 
8) Latin America  
9) Turkey 
10) Global: votes that address global issues, such as international agreements, the state of 
human rights in the world, UN issues. We also included votes on the Arctic under ‘global’. 
 
Topics 
1) Democracy, rule of law and human rights: clearly the largest category, mainly 
condemnations of developments or particular events (such as executions) in individual 
countries, a significant number of them are about LGBT rights in EP7, we need to check how 
many of these are based on a committee report. Particularly in this category difficult to tell 
exactly what the votes in EP6 dealt with.  
2) Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy: Candidate states (e.g. Turkey) and 
potential candidate states (e.g. Kosovo). Also includes votes on enlargement instruments. 
3) Common Foreign and Security Policy/Security and Defense Policy: general CFSP/ESDP issues 
such as annual reports, institutional questions and strategies. 
4) Arms: production, control and exports of arms, including defense industry policy, 
international arms control and disarmament diplomacy and export of arms. 
5) conflict: votes on policies towards particular international or intra-state conflicts including 
civil wars, terrorism and violent protests in third countries as well as votes on instruments 
of conflict management. As a coding rule: votes on “the situation in….” were coded as 
“conflict” if the country in question experiences an armed conflict or is in a post-conflict 
peace-building phase (e.g. Bosnia). In addition, if the vote refers to a country that is known 
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as being perceived as a challenge to European and international security (e.g. Iran or North 
Korea), the vote is coded as “conflict”. 
6) Agreements/Treaties: votes on bilateral agreements between EU and individual countries or 
regional blocs, or multilateral agreements, including Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements, Stabilisation and Association Agreements. When agreements or treaties fell 
into one of the categories above in addition to the Agreements/Treaties category, it was only 
coded under the category above (e.g. votes on the Nonproliferation Treaty were coded as 
“arms and armaments”) 
 
 
Table I: Cohesion (Agreement Index) in EP 6 and 7 per political group and 
issue area 
 AVERAGE AI 
 EUL/NGL G/EFA SOC ALDE EPP-ED IND/DEM-EFD UEN 
Sub Sahara Africa 0,84 0,96 0,99 0,98 0,95 0,57 0,93 
Asia 0,76 0,91 0,96 0,92 0,97 0,59 0,74 
Europe 0,67 0,86 0,92 0,94 0,91 0,40 0,73 
Russia 0,76 0,87 0,93 0,96 0,93 0,33 0,73 
Latin America 0,88 0,90 0,93 0,95 0,99 0,63 0,87 
MENA 0,78 0,91 0,90 0,88 0,94 0,54 0,73 
Global 0,80 0,84 0,94 0,92 0,91 0,45 0,71 
China 0,70 0,88 0,90 0,90 0,88 0,49 0,48 
Turkey 0,80 0,78 0,88 0,66 0,71 0,46 0,53 
USA/Canada 0,84 0,88 0,90 0,86 0,89 0,45 0,75 
Conflict 0,81 0,89 0,93 0,91 0,95 0,50 0,71 
Democracy, Human Rights, Rule 
of Law 0,76 0,92 0,93 0,94 0,92 0,56 0,71 
Agreements/treaties 0,74 0,89 0,93 0,93 0,96 0,40 0,84 
CFSP/ESDP 0,85 0,83 0,88 0,92 0,92 0,51 0,69 
Enlargement/ENP 0,72 0,83 0,91 0,82 0,81 0,42 0,60 
Arms and armaments 0,88 0,86 0,94 0,91 0,96 0,36 0,71 
All foreign and security policy 





Table II: Cohesion (Agreement Index) in EP 6 and 7 per national delegation 
and issue area 
  






Sub Sahara Africa 0,77 0,78 0,83 0,93 0,69 0,70 0,71 0,84 0,80 0,77 
Asia 0,80 0,83 0,82 0,95 0,78 0,68 0,78 0,85 0,85 0,77 
Europe 0,68 0,72 0,77 0,79 0,75 0,69 0,71 0,85 0,75 0,66 
Russia 0,71 0,63 0,72 0,85 0,70 0,56 0,65 0,82 0,69 0,72 
Latin America 0,67 0,73 0,83 0,92 0,56 0,69 0,64 0,71 0,75 0,59 
MENA 0,69 0,72 0,73 0,85 0,65 0,61 0,66 0,78 0,71 0,66 
Global 0,66 0,70 0,76 0,75 0,62 0,52 0,70 0,82 0,73 0,67 
China 0,68 0,57 0,59  0,68 0,63 0,57 0,54 0,59 0,63 
Turkey 0,57 0,58 0,78 0,67 0,71 0,56 0,65 0,66 0,67 0,52 





Conflict 0,71 0,72 0,79 0,82 0,68 0,60 0,68 0,82 0,76 0,72 
Democracy, Human Rights, 
Rule of Law 0,77 0,77 0,74 0,85 0,71 0,64 0,74 0,81 0,75 0,72 
Agreements/treaties 0,66 0,66 0,73 0,80 0,77 0,64 0,65 0,85 0,72 0,63 
CFSP/ESDP 0,53 0,71 0,86 0,71 0,49 0,44 0,59 0,88 0,72 0,65 
Enlargement/ENP 0,60 0,66 0,76 0,77 0,72 0,63 0,67 0,78 0,72 0,60 
Arms and armaments 0,54 0,67 0,71 0,48 0,50 0,42 0,62 0,79 0,62 0,59 
All All foreign and security 
policy votes 0,66 0,70 0,78 0,72 0,65 0,58 0,67 0,81 0,73 0,66 
   






Sub Sahara Africa 0,80 0,79 0,90 0,83 0,85 0,72 0,82 0,78 0,88 0,74 
Asia 0,80 0,79 0,89 0,88 0,85 0,80 0,82 0,87 0,93 0,72 
Europe 0,71 0,72 0,82 0,76 0,70 0,71 0,75 0,78 0,86 0,64 
Russia 0,76 0,67 0,77 0,76 0,70 0,77 0,63 0,86 0,85 0,63 
Latin America 0,71 0,64 0,83 0,84 0,79 0,74 0,76 0,78 0,82 0,65 
MENA 0,70 0,63 0,77 0,80 0,71 0,70 0,72 0,83 0,79 0,68 
Global 0,70 0,71 0,81 0,75 0,66 0,71 0,75 0,80 0,83 0,59 
China 0,74 0,81 0,82 0,71 0,71 0,69 0,65 1,00 0,90 0,60 
Turkey 0,60 0,73 0,65 0,69 0,62 0,57 0,53 0,80 0,83 0,56 





Conflict 0,75 0,71 0,82 0,83 0,75 0,74 0,74 0,86 0,83 0,65 
Democracy, Human Rights, 
Rule of Law 0,75 0,73 0,83 0,80 0,75 0,75 0,74 0,81 0,86 0,72 
Agreements/treaties 0,70 0,64 0,78 0,81 0,71 0,74 0,77 0,83 0,81 0,63 
CFSP/ESDP 0,68 0,69 0,84 0,59 0,75 0,65 0,74 0,83 0,83 0,52 
Enlargement/ENP 0,65 0,71 0,74 0,74 0,66 0,64 0,65 0,77 0,86 0,58 
Arms and armaments 0,61 0,62 0,75 0,65 0,64 0,56 0,66 0,68 0,71 0,50 
All All foreign and security 





   






Sub Sahara Africa 0,81 0,79 0,85 0,89 0,85 0,86 0,80 0,66 
Asia 0,75 0,85 0,87 0,86 0,89 0,85 0,81 0,65 
Europe 0,78 0,73 0,76 0,72 0,84 0,81 0,75 0,62 
Russia 0,65 0,76 0,75 0,76 0,79 0,79 0,72 0,52 
Latin America 0,83 0,70 0,90 0,85 0,87 0,72 0,72 0,75 
MENA 0,73 0,68 0,78 0,75 0,77 0,72 0,66 0,63 
Global 0,72 0,71 0,78 0,76 0,82 0,77 0,69 0,50 
China 0,65 0,74 0,79 0,76 0,75 0,78 0,68 0,59 
Turkey 0,54 0,70 0,78 0,60 0,70 0,79 0,65 0,54 





Conflict 0,70 0,76 0,81 0,80 0,85 0,80 0,71 0,57 
Democracy, Human Rights, 
Rule of Law 0,73 0,77 0,79 0,76 0,79 0,79 0,80 0,63 
Agreements/treaties 0,80 0,70 0,82 0,77 0,84 0,72 0,65 0,60 
CFSP/ESDP 0,71 0,69 0,87 0,85 0,92 0,84 0,50 0,47 
Enlargement/ENP 0,67 0,71 0,77 0,68 0,77 0,79 0,71 0,57 
Arms and armaments 0,73 0,63 0,67 0,69 0,76 0,71 0,60 0,43 
All All foreign and security 
policy votes 0,72 0,72 0,80 0,77 0,83 0,79 0,68 0,57 
 
